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Determining strategies for taking into account movements in 
asset prices is a perennially important issue for central banks. In 
this paper, an analysis is provided to address this issue for the 
U.S. economy. To do so, an empirical model of the U.S. economy 
is constructed and estimated, and the estimated model is simulated 
with a set of alternative monetary policy rules. Comparing the 
stabilization performance of the rules, it is found that: i ) by 
responding to a larger set of policy indicators and taking a more 
aggressive stance toward inflation and output gap in particular, 
the Federal Reserve could have achieved a much higher degree of 
stabilization; ii) had the Federal Reserve responded to its histori- 
cal policy indicators differently, it could have conducted a near- 
optimal policy rule, even without taking into account movements 
in housing and stock prices; iii) the Federal Reserve could have 
likewise achieved close-to-optimal stabilization results by properly 
responding to movements in asset prices, on top of its historical 
policy scheme; and iv) stock price inflation contains more useful 
information that helps further stabilize the economy than does 
housing price inflation.
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I. Introduction
Since the mid 80s, asset prices in many countries have undergone 
major medium-term fluctuations, sometimes ending in abrupt corrections. 
In the U.S., the last two decades have witnessed significant and 
persistent increase in asset prices followed by sharp downward cor- 
rections. The rise in asset prices early in the last decade was mainly 
triggered by low interest rates, set by the Federal Reserve Board to 
diminish the blow caused by the collapse of the dotcom bubble and to 
combat deflation risk. In the wake of the subprime mortgage crisis, the 
recent downturn in the U.S. housing and stock market has caused 
multiple adverse effects on the financial and regulatory framework of 
the world economy.
Such large swings in asset prices brought about a debate over what 
the appropriate responses of the central bank are to asset price move- 
ments. Centered around this issue are the following questions: i) 
Should asset prices in the measure of inflation be targeted by monetary 
policy? ii) What can asset prices tell central banks about monetary 
policy? iii) What do asset prices add to other indicators that inform the 
central banks of the desirable monetary policy? This paper primarily 
aims to address the last two questions in the context of the U.S. 
economy, by asking whether the monetary authority should respond to 
asset prices in order to stabilize output and inflation variability, and if 
so, by how much? 
There has been considerable debate on the role of asset prices in the 
formulation of monetary policy. As summarized by Eitrheim (2008), 
there have been three views on the policy implications of asset price 
movements. First, in the “benign neglect view” shared by Bernanke and 
Gertler (1999, 2001) and Bean (2003), effects of asset prices are suf- 
ficiently incorporated in a flexible inflation targeting regime. In par- 
ticular, Bernanke and Gertler recommended that monetary policy should 
not respond to asset price fluctuations unless they flag changes in 
expected inflation. The second view is the “activist view,” according to 
which macroeconomic performance can be improved by responding 
proactively to asset prices. The most recent contributors to this view 
are Cecchetti et al. (2000), who claimed finding strong support for 
including stock prices in the policy rule of the central bank. Moreover, 
Alchian and Klein (1973) and Goodhart (1995) stressed the importance 
of incorporating asset prices in a broader measure of inflation for 
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central banks to respond to, because fluctuations in asset prices tend 
to affect expected inflation.1 Finally, the “discretionary judgment view” 
advocated by Borio and Lowe (2002) and Bordo and Jeanne (2002) has 
it that some discretion should be entertained, acknowledging that abrupt 
changes in asset prices, followed by sharp unwinding of financial im- 
balances, may inflict substantial costs.
As aforementioned, this paper addresses the importance of asset 
prices in the conduct of the U.S. monetary policy. Our interest can be 
summarized by two questions. The first one is, “How well has the 
Federal Reserve executed its monetary policy since the 80s?” An an- 
swer to this question is sought by comparing the stabilization per- 
formance of the historically conducted policy against the optimal policy 
that can achieve the best stabilization results for output and inflation. 
In case the historical rule failed to achieve any close-to-optimal 
stabilization results, the second question comes into play: “Could the 
Federal Reserve have improved the stabilization performance of its 
policy, had it taken into account the movements in the asset prices?” 
The answer to this question can be sought by evaluating the extra 
contribution of the asset prices, on the top of the historical rule, to 
achieving better stabilization results. 
With these questions in mind, an empirical model for the U.S. eco- 
nomy is constructed. Within the context of the empirical model, whether 
and how much the performance of monetary policy can be improved is 
examined by taking asset prices into account. Specifically, the estimat- 
ed model is simulated with a set of alternative monetary policy rules 
and the stabilization performance of the rules compared against a 
performance metric comprising the weighted averages of variabilities in 
output gap and inflation.
Comparison results among alternative interest rate rules suggest 
there is plenty of room for further stabilization of inflation and output 
if the Federal Reserve shifts from the historical monetary policy rule to 
the optimal one. Improvements upon the historical rule can be achieved 
either by responding to additional policy indicators (especially the asset 
prices) in the optimal rule per se, or by responding solely to the his- 
torical policy indicators more aggressively than under the rule actually 
implemented. Likewise, as long as the Federal Reserve maintains ap- 
propriate reactions to the historical policy indicators, housing price 
1 In an empirical analysis for the U.S., Filardo (2000) finds little evidence that 
Goodhart's recommendation would reliably improve economic outcomes.
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inflation turns out to have little extra information for further stabiliza- 
tion. Therefore, the Federal Reserve could have achieved close-to- 
optimal stabilization results by properly responding to movements in 
asset prices, on top of its historical policy scheme. Additionally, stock 
price inflation turns out to contain more useful information that helps 
further stabilize the economy than does housing price inflation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 constructs 
and brings to data the workhorse model for the policy simulations. In 
Section 3, the stabilization performances of a series of alternative 
monetary policy rules are compared, during which interim conclusions 
on the role of asset price are drawn. Section 4 concludes the paper.
II. Construction and Estimation of the Model
In this section, the workhorse model for evaluating alternative 
monetary policy rules is developed. Towards this end, we build on the 
monetary policy model of Ball (1999) and Rudebusch and Svensson 
(1999) by allowing an explicit role for asset prices. The model has three 
main components: macroeconomic block, asset price block, and mone- 
tary policy block. The specification of the model is first described, and 
then the estimation results are reported.
A. The Model Components
The macroeconomic block of the model is a standard IS-Phillip curve 
model, extended to include housing and stock price inflation. This 





t－1＋ε1t       (1a)




t－2      (1b)





et＝θ1(it－πt)＋θ 2(it－1－πt－1)＋v t                  (1c)
v t＝ρvt－1＋ε 5t                          (1d)
Equation (1a) is an accelerationist version of the Phillips curve, in 
which the general price inflation (π ) depends on its lag, lagged real 
output gap (y), and the lagged change in the real exchange rate (e). The 
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presence of stock price inflation (πs) and housing price inflation (πh) in 
(1a) is based on the arguments of Goodhart (1995) and Alchian and 
Klein (1973) that asset price inflation can signal inflationary pressure 
on general price level. 
The second equation is a standard dynamic IS-type equation, linking 
real output gap (y) to its own lags, lagged real exchange rate (e), lags 
in housing price inflation, and lagged real interest rate as the dif- 
ference of nominal interest rate (i) and inflation rate. The inclusion of 
asset price inflation in (1b) reflects the view that hikes in asset prices 
may boost aggregate demand. 
Equations (1c)-(1d) provide a link between real exchange rate and 
real interest rate. To match the observed persistence in real exchange 
rate, the shock (v) to the real exchange rate equation, an AR(1) pro- 
cess, is specified. 
Regarding the asset price block, the housing price inflation is as- 






t－2＋γ3yt－1＋γ4yt－2＋γ5(it－1－πt－1)＋ε3t      (2a)
where the effects of real interest rate are justified by the standard 
asset pricing theory. The behavior of stock price inflation is specified 
as a simple random walk 
　　　　　　　　　　πst＝ε4t.                            (2b)
To close the model, it is necessary to describe the behavior of the 
central bank. It is assumed that the central bank sets the nominal 
interest rate in response to the state of the economy, following some 
Taylor-type monetary policy rule detailed in the next subsection.
B. Estimation Results
The data series used to estimate the model spans 1980:Q1 to 2008:
Q2.2 The measure of real output is the seasonally adjusted real GDP 
2 The sources of data series are as follows: real GDP, potential GDP, GDP 
deflators, federal funds rate; dollar exchange rates with regard to the Euro are 
obtained from the data base of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Dow 
Jones Industrial Average index is taken from the BOK database. Taken from the 
statistics warehouse of the ECB is the GDP deflator series for the Euro area 
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in 2000 prices. As a measure of the price level, the GDP deflator is 
used with the year 2000 being the base year. Nationwide housing price 
index is used as proxy for the housing price, and Dow Jones Industrial 
Average index is used for stock price. The real exchange rate series is 
constructed using the nominal exchange rate between the Euro and 
the U.S. dollar and the GDP deflator in the two economies.3 The 
nominal interest rate is proxied by the federal funds rate. 
To estimate the model, the series of general price inflation, stock and 
housing price inflation, and output gap are needed. Output gap is 
constructed as the log-deviation of actual GDP from the potential GDP 
calculated by the Congressional Budget Office. The general price and 
housing price inflation rates are constructed as the year-on-year rates 
of change to circumvent the problem of seasonality, while stock price 
inflation rates are calculated relative to previous periods. Therefore, to 
maintain consistency across the model and data, CPI and housing 
price inflation series are all viewed as year-on-year. All data series are 
de-meaned prior to estimation.
Each equation in the model is separately estimated by OLS, except 
that Equations (1c)-(1d) are jointly estimated by Cochrane-Orcutt itera- 
tion. The empirical counterpart of the model is given in Table 1.
In the estimated Phillips curve Equation (1a’), the contemporaneous 
trade-off between inflation and output gap is quite small around 0.026. 
Most parameters, however, are significantly estimated with expected 
signs. The estimated coefficient, -0.012, on the changes in real ex- 
change rate implies that the real appreciation of dollar leads to lower 
inflation, although that effect is not so significant. Housing price infla- 
tion turns out to convey an early (yet insignificant) signal for general 
price inflation. 
The estimated IS curve (1b’) shows that higher real interest rate 
decreases real output, while higher stock price inflation tends to in- 
crease real output. Also, higher housing price inflation tends to boost 
output with a one-period lag, but such effect is reversed in the fol-
over 1995:Q1-2008:Q2. The German producer price index series over 1980: 
Q1-1994:Q4, available from the BOK database, is splined to the Euro GDP 
deflator series. The nationwide housing price index is available from the office of 
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight.
3 The real exchange rate is constructed as PUS∙NER/PEURO, where the 
nominal exchange rate (NER) corresponds to the units of Euro (their equivalents 
for 1980:Q1-1998:Q4) per U.S. dollar. Therefore, higher real exchange rates 
constructed mean real appreciation of the U.S. dollar.




t－1＋ε1t            (1a’)




    (12.305)         (－0.176)         (－1.827)   (2.357)    (－2.161)  (1b’)
   ＋0.175πht－1－0.179πht－2＋ε2t
     (1.978)    (－2.015)   [0.007]
et＝0.402( i t－π t)－0.164( i t－1－π t－1)＋vt                                   (1c’)
   (1.920)       (－0.386)
vt＝0.966vt－1＋ε5t                                                       (1d’)
   (30.090)  [0.031]
Housing Price Inflation Equation
πht＝1.310πht－1－0.387πht－2＋0.162yt－1－0.144yt－2－0.038( i t－1－π t－1)＋ε3t
    (14.163)    (－4.124)  (1.343)    (－1.187)  (－1.777)      [0.008] (2a’)
πst＝ε4t                                                                  (2b’)
    [0.065]
Monetary Policy Rule Equation
i t＝1.013 i t－1－0.118 i t－2＋0.209π t＋0.502yt－0.390yt－1＋εRt                (3)
   (9.322)    (－1.453)  (2.374)  (4.250)   (－3.692)  [0.006]
TABLE 1
ESTIMATED MODEL4
Note: The numbers in parentheses are t-values of estimates, and those in 
square brackets are standard deviations of the disturbances.
lowing period. Contrary to economic intuition, real appreciation causes 
the output gap to fall, although its magnitude is not significant.
According to real exchange rate Equation (1c’), higher real interest 
rate leads to real appreciation in the same period as theoretically 
predicted. The coefficient on the lagged real exchange rate implies, 
however, that the initial real appreciation is followed by real deprecia- 
tion of moderate magnitude in the next period. 
In Equation (1d’), the estimate 0.966 of ρ implies a considerable 
degree of inertia in the shock to the real exchange rate, reflecting the 
4 The final specification of estimated equations is reached after experimenting 
with inclusion/exclusion of variables and imposing restrictions, guided by the 
R-bar square criterion.
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observed persistence in the real exchange rate. In Equation (2a’), the 
housing price inflation is estimated to increase, following higher output 
growth in the previous period, and decrease with higher real interest 
rate. The estimated standard error for the stock price inflation Equa- 
tion (2b’) is larger than that for the housing price inflation by the 
factor of 8. 
Finally, the estimated monetary policy rule (3’) is an extended Taylor- 
type rule, under which the nominal interest rate is adjusted in response 
to the set of policy indicators, Xt
HP
＝[πt yt yt－1 it－1 it－2]’.5 The estimated 
rule states that the Federal Reserve has raised the federal funds rate 
in response to higher inflationary pressure reflected in inflation and 
real output with a considerable degree of policy inertia. 
III. Evaluation of Alternative Monetary Policy
A. Methodology and Strategy
Substituting real exchange rate terms via Equations (1c’) and (1d’), 
the estimated macro economy (1’)-(2’) can be cast into a state space 
form
Xt＋1＝AXt＋Bit＋ε t＋1                          (4)
where A and B are matrices of the model parameters, Xt＝[πt π t－1 π t－2








t－1 vt vt－1]’ is the vector of state variables, 
and ε t＝[ε1t 0 0 ε2t 0 0 0 ε3t 0 ε4t 0 0 ε5t 0]’ is the conformably constructed 
vector of disturbances assumed to be a multivariate white noise.6
Given the structure of the macro economy in (4), comparing alter- 
native monetary policies requires a criterion by which to evaluate the 
performance of each policy scheme. It is assumed that the monetary 
authority has preferences over variabilities in the two goal variables
(i.e., output gap and inflation). In particular, for a discount factor β∈
(0, 1), we consider the intertemporal loss function in period t,
5 We experimented with the inclusion of asset price inflation in the policy 
reaction function of the Fed, but the results were not supportive of any 
significant responses from the Fed toward asset prices. 
6 The forms of (A, B, Ψ) are provided in the appendix.














                             
(5a)
where the period expected loss is a weighted sum of the conditional 
variances
Et[Lt＋τ]＝Φyvart (yt＋τ)＋(1－Φy) var t (πt＋τ), 0＜Φy＜1       (5b)
which, in turn, can be calculated recursively given the evolution of the 
economy (4) and a linear feedback rule for the nominal interest rate.7
In subsequent policy evaluations, the five monetary policy rules sum- 
marized in Table 2 are considered. In the appendix, each of the five 
rules in Table 2 can be represented as a particular linear feedback 
instruments rule of the form it＝FXt. This being the case, the value of 
the loss as the infinite sum of conditional variances of the goal vari- 
ables can be calculated for each rule.8
A few words are in order for the five rules under comparison. The 
rule HP (i.e., historically performed) is the estimated rule in Section 2 
that the Federal Reserve is believed to have implemented.9 This rule is 
not likely to achieve the lower bound of the loss function (5), in that,  
i) the set Xt
HP of policy indicators for HP is, in effect, a subset of the 
whole state vector Xt, and that, ii) the coefficients in HP are not 
explicitly optimized, but fixed at their estimates. The rule UO (i.e., un- 
constrained optimum), derived by solving the stochastic linear regulator 
problem (4)-(5), is the optimal rule minimizing the loss function.10 The 
UO improves upon HP because the former allows the nominal interest 
rate to optimally respond to the whole state vector Xt, or equivalently to 





In addition to the two rules above, three versions of constrained 
optimal rules are also considered. First, rule CO[I], minimizes loss 
among the rules, under which the nominal interest rate responds to 
Xt
HP
 only. Specifically, CO[I] differs from HP in that the former is 
7 The details involved are shown in the appendix.
8 For practical purposes, the simple imposition of an interest rate non- 
negativity is regarded as non-binding. It should be noted, however, that such 
nonlinear constraints render our methods and results sensitive to the economy’s 
average inflation rate, as discussed in Wolman (2006).
9 For interpretational ease and fair comparison with other rules, the 
disturbance term in the estimated rule is ignored.
10 See appendix for details on deriving the optimal rule.
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Rule Policy Indicators Reaction Coefficients
HP Xt
HP historical estimates
UO Xt or Xt
HP∪
π t－1, π t－2,        
            
{                 }
      π ht, π ht－1, πst, πst－1




(constrained) minimizer of the loss
CO[II] Xt






t－1} (constrained) minimizer of the loss 
CO[III] Xt
















t－1}: minimizer of the 
loss 
TABLE 2
POLICY RULES UNDER COMPARISON
equipped with optimized reaction coefficients while the latter is not. It 
can be readily deduced that, LOSSCO[I], the loss corresponding to CO[I], 
will lie between LOSSUO and LOSSHP, where the two losses are for UO 
and HP, respectively. Another constrained optimal rule, CO[II], mini- 
mizes loss in the class of rules that adjust the nominal interest rate in 
response [πht, πht－1, πst, πst－1], as well as XtHP. Finally, rule CO[III] is 
considered, under which the nominal interest rate optimally responds 
to [πht, πht－1, πst, πst－1], while the reaction coefficients on XtHP are fixed at 
their historical estimates in (3’). 
Having described the features of the rules under consideration, we 
briefly explain the strategy for comparing the performance of these 
rules. We set off by comparing HP and UO, from which the firsthand 
idea can be obtained on the maximum possible improvements, LOSSHP 
- LOSSUO, by the optimal feedback rule. 
We then examine how CO[I] compares with UO and HP. The 
motivation here is as follows: if CO[I] stands in comparison with the 
optimal rule UO, then it can be deduced that the set of historical policy 
indicators Xt
HP in CO[I] is a good proxy for the whole state vector. 
Therefore, the selection of policy indicators per se by the Federal Reserve 
has been satisfactory enough. From the difference between CO[I] and 
HP, either in the reaction coefficients or in their minimized losses, 
whether or not the policy stance reflected by the coefficients in HP was 
appropriate in stabilizing output and inflation can be determined.
The next piece of evaluation exercise is centered around the usefulness 
of asset price inflation in stabilizing the economy. This issue is ad- 
dressed via two comparisons: CO[I] vs. CO[II], and HP vs. CO[III]. In 
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Rule Φy
Coefficients
π t π t－1 π t－2 yt yt－1 i t－1 i t－2 π
h
t π ht－1 π st π st－1 et e t－1

































































































































































































































































































PROPERTIES OF ALTERNATIVE MONETARY POLICY RULES
the former, the focus is on gauging how useful the asset price inflation 
is if the central bank is already optimally responding to the variables 
in Xt
HP by following CO[I]. In the latter comparison, the purpose is to 
see by how much asset price inflation further stabilizes inflation and 
output, on top of what the historical policy stance has already achieved. 
B. Comparison I: HP vs. UO
The results of policy evaluations are provided in Table 3 and Table 
4. Table 3 summarizes the policy reaction coefficients of the rules, 
where five different preferences over the policy goal are considered if 
applicable. In Table 4, minimized losses and volatilities of the two goal 
variables are reported. 
The first row of Table 3, labeled HP, replicates the estimated rule. 
The next five rows concern the optimized rule UO for Φy＝(0, 0.25, 
0.50, 0.75, 1). The reaction coefficients for the two rules exhibit several 
features detailed below.
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TABLE 4
VOLATILITIES UNDER ALTERNATIVE POLICY RULES
Weight Volatility
Rule


































































































Notes: Losses and volatilities are calculated for β＝0.99.
       1) Square root of the minimized loss.
       2) Square root of the discounted sum of the conditional variance of 
output gap.
       3) Square root of the discounted sum of the conditional variance of 
inflation.
First, while HP is characterized by a considerable degree of inertia in 
adjusting the nominal interest rate, the five versions of UO are not. 
Specifically, the long-run AR coefficient on the nominal rate for HP 
amounts to 0.895, but those for UO range below zero. This suggests 
that the Federal Reserve may have been overly inertial in adjusting 
nominal interest rate, responding too smoothly to changes in economic 
conditions.
Second, optimal adjustments of the federal funds rate require much 
more aggressive responses toward contemporaneous inflation and out- 
put gap. For example, the contemporaneous response coefficients for 
inflation and output gap under HP are 0.209 and 0.502, respectively. 
However, corresponding numbers under UO are 12.275 and 15.673, 
respectively, when the Federal Reserve gives equal weight to volatilities 
in inflation and output.
Third, the optimal conduct of monetary policy requires the Federal 
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Reserve to respond to asset price inflation, although the degrees of 
responses are smaller than those directed toward price inflation and 
output gap. For example, the sum of coefficients on housing price 
inflation is 5.847 on average, lower than 71.861 for price inflation and 
29.564 for output gap. The sum of coefficients on stock price inflation 
is 2.021, smaller than on housing price inflation. This feature is re- 
miniscent of Brainard (1967), who recommended extra caution in re- 
sponding to more volatile, hence uncertain, movements in stock price 
inflation.
It is worthwhile to see how differences in the two rules are reflected 
in their stabilization performance. The two columns labeled HP and UO 
in Table 4 show that UO does improve upon the historical rule HP. On 
average, total volatility under HP is 3.270 times as high under UO. 
Even when the Federal Reserve is solely concerned with output stabi- 
lization, putting Φy＝1, the volatility of inflation under UO is lower 
than that under HP. 
From the comparison results in this subsection, the first interim 
conclusion can be drawn: by responding to a larger set of policy in- 
dicators and taking a reaction scheme more aggressive yet less inertial 
than the historical one, the Federal Reserve could have achieved a much 
higher degree of stabilization.
C. Comparison II: CO[I] vs. UO & HP 
The next task is to delve into the reason why UO outperforms HP: is 
it because UO responds to a larger set of policy indicators, or because 
UO takes a policy stance inherently different from the historical coun- 
terpart? To answer this question, UO is compared with CO[I]. The in- 
tuition here is: the closer CO[I] is to UO, the more likely it is that UO 
outperforms HP, not due to additional policy indicators, but owing to 
the better stabilizing adjustment scheme for nominal interest rate.
The results for CO[I] in Table 3 show that, once the Federal Reserve 
revises its historical policy stance for better stabilization, the resulting 
rule exhibits a resemblance to the unconstrained optimal rule UO. For 
example, as under UO, response coefficients on inflation and output 
gap under CO[I] are much higher than those under HP. Again, as 
under UO, the nominal interest rate is not subject to too much inertia. 
In terms of policy performance, the proximity of CO[I] to UO is more 
conspicuous. A casual look at the columns for UO and CO[I] in Table 
4 confirms that the performance of the two rules are very similar, 
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especially for modest weights on output volatility. The interpretation of 
this finding is that, even if the central bank is constrained to use the 
historical policy indicators in Xt
HP
 only, an appropriate policy stance 
can ensure close-to-optimal stabilization results.
Results in this subsection posit the second interim conclusion: had 
the Federal Reserve responded to its historical policy indicators 
differently, it could have conducted a near-optimal policy rule, even 
without taking into account the movements in asset prices.
D. Comparison III: CO[I] vs. CO[II], and HP vs. CO[III]
From the results thus far, a direct question rises: once the policy 
stance with respect to other variables (especially those in Xt
HP) are 
taken appropriately, how much extra information does asset price infla- 
tion have for further stabilization? This question is addressed by com- 
paring CO[I] and CO[II]. In Table 3, reaction coefficients of the two 
rules are quite similar, setting aside those for asset price inflation. In 
Table 4, the stabilization performance of the two rules are almost im- 
possible to distinguish. This suggests that, as long as the Federal 
Reserve responds appropriately to its historical policy indicators, not 
much additional stabilization gains are obtained from additionally res- 
ponding to asset price inflation.  
Another question that remains is: if the central bank commits itself 
to the historical policy scheme toward Xt
HP, how useful would asset 
price inflation be in the conduct of monetary policy? The answer to 
this question is found by comparing HP and CO[III]. In Table 3, the 
central bank in such a situation would have to change the nominal 
rate actively in response to asset price inflation. Interestingly, the mag- 
nitudes of responses toward stock price inflation are much smaller 
than those concerning housing price inflation, similar for UO. More 
interesting is that the performance of CO[III] is comparable to CO[I]. 
This provides another interim conclusion for this subsection: the 
Federal Reserve could also have achieved close-to-optimal stabilization 
results by properly responding to movements in asset prices on top of 
its historical policy scheme.  
　　　　　　　
E. Comparison IV: Which Asset Price to Respond to ?
The final question addressed now is: which asset price should the 
Federal Reserve choose for better stabilization results? In other words, 
which asset price contains more useful information for the Federal 






































































Notes: 1) Square root of the minimized loss.
       2) Square root of the discounted sum of the conditional variance of 
output gap.
       3) Square root of the discounted sum of the conditional variance of 
inflation.
TABLE 5
VOLATILITIES UNDER CONSTRAINED POLICY RULES
Reserve trying to stabilize the economy? To answer this question, two 
variants of CO[III] are compared. The first one, CO[III]-S, allows the 
Federal Reserve to optimally respond to stock price inflation only while 
the reaction coefficients on Xt
HP are fixed at their historical estimates. 
Similarly, the second variant, CO[III]-H, requires optimal responses to 
housing price inflation only. Stabilization results of the two rules are 
reported in Table 5. Unless the Federal Reserve is solely concerned 
with stabilizing inflation, CO[III]-S outperforms CO[III]-H. A direct in- 
terpretation of this finding is that stock price inflation contains more 
useful information that helps stabilize the economy further than does 
housing price inflation. Responding to movements in stock price, there- 
fore, can be a firsthand shortcut for the Federal Reserve in improving 
its stabilization performance.
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IV. Conclusion
This paper provides an empirical investigation tailored for the U.S. 
economy on the role of asset prices in the conduct of monetary policy. 
We constructed an empirical model, simulated the estimated model with 
a set of alternative monetary policy rules, and compared the stabi- 
lization performance of the rules against a performance metric com- 
prising weighted averages of variabilities in output gap and inflation.
Comparison results among alternative interest rate rules cast some 
light on the question, “Should the Federal Reserve have reacted to the 
fluctuations in asset prices for better stabilization performances?” The 
findings are summarized as follows: First, by responding to a larger set 
of policy indicators and taking a more aggressive stance toward in- 
flation and output gap compared to the historical indicator, the Federal 
Reserve could have achieved a much higher degree of stabilization. 
Second, had the Federal Reserve responded to its historical policy in- 
dicators differently, it could have conducted a near-optimal policy rule, 
even without taking into account the movements in housing and stock 
prices. Third, the Federal Reserve could also have achieved close-to- 
optimal stabilization results by properly responding to movements in 
asset prices, on top of its historical policy scheme. Finally, stock price 
inflation contains more useful information that helps further stabilize 
the economy than does housing price inflation.
Future research may help increase our understanding of housing 
price and monetary policy, as the results are rather tentative at the 
current stage. First of all, the results are based on the model in this 
paper which, along many dimensions, is quite simple and limited. In 
particular, resorting to purely backward-looking specifications of key 
structural equations, the results obtained should be interpreted subject 
to a caution in the spirit of the Lucas critique. Along another dimen- 
sion, the issue of monetary policy and asset prices may be better 
understood if the role of financial market fragility is incorporated into 
the model and empirically examined.  
Another key issue to address in future research is whether the 
monetary authority should respond in any way to asset price bubbles, 
as discussed in Filardo (2004) for example. A more sophisticated ap- 
proach that can address these issues is left for future research.
(Received 27 October 2009; Revised 5 November 2009)
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Appendix I. Derivation of the Optimal Rule UO 
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subject to the law of motion 
Xt＋1＝AXt＋Bit＋ε t＋1,                     (A1)
where
 π
Φ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤
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e
, e1 and e4 denote 
1×11 row vectors whose elements are all 0s, with the first and fourth 
elements being 1, respectively. 
As in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000), the optimal instrument rule is 
the vector F that satisfies 
F＝－(B’PB)－1B’PA,                       (A2)
where the matrix P solves the Ricatti equation
P＝－R＋δ A’PA－δ 2A’PB(δ B’PB)－1B’PA.             (A3 )
When actually solving for P, the RHS of (A3) is used to get an updated 
P in the LHS in a recursive manner, starting with P0＝－R.
The optimal rule described above may appear infeasible, prescribing 
the nominal interest rate as a linear function of the state vector Xt that 
contains unobservable vt and vt－1. As shown in Appendix [III], however, 
the optimal rule can be translated into an equivalent rule in which the 
nominal rate responds to Zt.
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Appendix II. Calculation of the Loss Function
Calculating the value of loss function for a rule of the form i t＝FXt is 
now explained. Plugging in the rule into the state space representation 
of the economy, we get 
Xt＝MXt－1＋ε t, with M＝A＋BF
Given the covariance matrix ∑
ε  of the white noise error term ε t, the 
conditional variance ∑t
X
 of Xt evolves as 




M’＋∑ε, t≥0                   (A4)
where we assume ∑o
X
＝011×11. 
From the relationship Yt＝C’Xt, the conditional variance matrix ∑t
Y
 
for the goal variable vector Yt is given by 
∑t
Y＝C ’∑t
XC,                       (A5)
from which values of the period losses are easily calculated. Recursive 
use of (A4) and (A5) and summing up the discounted period losses 
yield the results wanted. 





















































Appendix III. (A, B, Ψ) Matrices
α1－α3θ1 －α3(θ2－θ1) α3θ2 α2 0 α3(θ2－θ1) －α3θ2 α4 0 0 0 α3 －α3
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
－β3－β4θ1 －β4θ2 0 β1 β1 β4θ2 0 β7 β8 β5 β6 β4 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
A＝ 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
－γ5 0 0 γ3 γ4 0 0 γ1 γ2 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ρ 0
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